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1. Introduction
About two-thirds of the way through the G recension of the Life ofAesop,^ just
after Aesop has gained his freedom and negotiated a peace agreement between
Samos and King Croesus of Lydia, there is a curious passage in which we are told
that the legendary fabulist ‘wrote down (onyypavi/dpevoq) the stories and fables
that go by his name even now and deposited them in the library (KaxeX,ui£V ei<; xfiv
PipA,io0fiKnv)’ {Vita G 100)? The image of Aesop writing down his fables in
Lydia may be the stuff of fiction, but in broaching the seemingly incongruous idea
of Aesopie authorship, it also draws attention to the reality that Aesop’s fables
were encountered in antiquity not only as an oral tradition but also as a written
body of literature. Of course, ancient readers of the Life would have been keenly
aware of the material nature of the text in their hands. Because the Life circulated
together with fable collections in our earliest and best manuscripts (e.g.. Vita G),
it is possible to conceive of the biography as a whole — and, in particular, passages

’ The text I use throughout is Vita G, as edited by Perry 1952, but I have also consulted
Ferrari 1997 and Papathomopoulos 1990. Vita G is generally held to be our oldest and best
version of the Life ofAesop, but cf Ferrari 1997, 12-20, for a dissenting view. References
below to Vita W are also to Perry 1952 (with consultation of Papathomopoulos 1999),
while references to the so-called ‘Planudean’ version are to Eberhard 1872. The best stud
ies of the text history of the Life ofAesop are Perry 1933; 1936, 1-70; 1952, 1-4 and 1032. Useful overviews can be found in Ferrari 1997, 41-45; Karla 2001, 10-15; Holzberg
2002, 72-73; Kurke 2011, 16-17.
2 Aiotonog ouv auxa (Tuyypa\|/dpevo(; tovx; iblom; koyon? kuI puOouq, xoug dxpi Kai vuv
6vopa^opevou(;, Kaxskutev eii; xfjv PipZioOpicnv {Vita G 100).
Staves and Masters in the Ancient Novel, 233-251
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such as this one - as lending a kind of authority to the fables it introduced? Thus
an ancient reader could feel confident (or, perhaps, take pleasure in the fiction)
that the product he was holding was an authentic edition of Aesop’s fables, written
by the fabulist himself before its safe installation in a Lydian bibliotheke.'^
What is of primary interest to me in this paper is the crucial moment at which
this passage occurs in the Life. Not only has Aesop acquired parrhesia and eleutheria {Vita G 89) in his release from slavery, he has also, for the first time in the
Life, begun to tell recognizable Aesopic fables. That is, while the Life presents
Aesop as a skilled manipulator of language and a talented ‘performer of wisdom’
in a wide range of circumstances,^ the legendary fabulist does not tell an actual
fable until after his release from slavery {Vita G 89).® Indeed, all of the known
fables in the Life ofAesop appear between this scene and the end of the work {Vita
G 94-142). My aim in this paper is to describe the differences between Aesop’s
manner of storytelling during and after his enslavement, and to explore some of
^ Holzberg 2002.
'' With two notable exceptions (Finkelpearl 2003 and Holzberg 2002), this passage is usually
ignored by scholars, and that is understandable: the various reeensions of the Life ofAesop
differ from one another in many places, and in some ways this is just one of many unhistorical, preposterous moments in the text. Owing to the difficulties of the text history of
the Life ofAesop, it is indeed risky to put too much interpretive pressure on any specific
turn of phrase, especially one that is so blatantly anachronistic, and which, moreover, does
not occur in the same form in every recension. As it happens, other versions of the Life of
Aesop do not describe Aesop’s writing and depositing of his fables in precisely the same
terms, but the idea that Aesop wrote down his fables after gaining his freedom does surface
in Vita W at roughly the same point in the narrative (cTOTypaijiac; onv xoui; ibfoui; puBonq
Toug pGXPi vuv cwayivcocncopevoui; KaxeA-iTie xw PaoiXei, ‘Then, writing down the same
stories known to be his even now, he left them with the king’. Vita W100). In the so-called
‘Planudean’ Life there is no mention of writing or libraries, but an essential change in Ae
sop’s status and manner of fable-telling is nonetheless discernible. In addition, the opening
section of a version of the Life that survives with the fables of Aphthonius (c. 4th century)
describes Aesop’s fables as deemed ‘worthy of the library’ (fiSKaOn BiBLioOfiicnc); see
Eberhard, 1872, 306-308.
^ The description of Greek sage figures as ‘performers of wisdom’ in Martin 1998, which I
discuss in more detail below, is especially useful for characterizing Aesop’s actions in the
Life ofAesop', cf. also Kurke 2011, 102-106.
^ At Vita G 94, Aesop addresses a fable on the subject of slavery and freedom ^ the story of
‘The Two Roads’ - to the people of Samos. There has always been significant difference
of opinion among fable scholars as to what ought to count as a ‘fable’. Perry 1959 is still
the best overview of the problem (cf. Perry 1952, ix and 1965, xix-xxviii). See also van
Dijk 1997, 3-73 for a thorough treatment of ancient terminology and parameters of the
fable. On specific questions regarding the quantity and distribution of fables in the Life of
Aesop, see especially Perry 1952, 478; Nojgaard 1964, 471; Holzberg 1992, 1996; van
Dijk 1995; and Jouarmo 2011. For the fable of ‘The Two Roads’, cf Hesiod, Works and
Days 287-292.
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the ways in which ideas of writing and archiving function to mark the transfor
mation of Aesop into a fully-developed fabulist.^ While I am primarily interested
in how changes in the manner and register of Aesop’s storytelling fit into the
overall structure of the narrative of the Life, 1 will also be approaching the Life as
a text that is a valuable site for thinking about the fable tradition writ large, its
status as a literary genre, its orality and textuality, and its relationship to and de
pendence upon the figure of Aesop.**

2. Reading Aesopic Performances
To borrow a phrase from the work by Richard Martin on the dynamics of sage
performances in archaic Greece, we may describe Aesop s actions in the Life as
‘performances of wisdom’‘Performance’ accommodates both the non-verbal
and the verbal elements of communication by drawing attention to the roles
played by actor(s), audience(s), and context in the production of meaning.
Whether applied to the telling of a famous fable before the people of Samos (cf.,
e.g.. Vita G 94) or to Aesop using his body to prove his innocence to his master
(cf., e.g.. Vita G 2-4), the term ‘performance’ will cover most of the common
features of the various types of Aesopic communication we will be analyzing.'”
’ In focusing attention on orality and textuality in the Life ofAesop, I do not intend to enter
into the debate over when and where the Life itself was first written down, or over the
particular processes by which oral traditions about Aesop’s biography evolved into a writ
ten Ii/e. See Perry 1952, 2-4, West 1984, Luzzatto 1996, and Kurke 2011. For a recent and
judicious overview, see Konstantakos 2013.
* That is, my interest is in how ideas about oral and written storytelling surface in the narra
tive of the Life as it has come down to us. In this arena I have been influenced by studies
of oral and text-based storytelling traditions in the fields of social anthropology and per
formance studies. In particular, the complex relationship between ‘embodied perfor
mances’ and the concept of the ‘archive’, as articulated in Taylor 2003, has been instru
mental in shaping my approach to the Life in this paper.
^ Martin 1998. For his conception of ‘performance’ Martin draws on the work of social an
thropology and sociolinguists. Kurke 2011, 102-106, discusses the applicability to Aesop
of Martin’s work on Greek sages in considerable detail.
‘Performance’ is a particularly useful descriptor because ‘fable-telling’ alone would be an
inaccurate description of what we encounter in the Life. To begin with, the text of the Life
does not itself tell fables, in the way, say, a collection of fahles such as the Collectio Augustana might reasonably be described as telling fables. Nor is it quite as simple as stating
that, in the Life, Aesop tells fahles. As it happens, he does much that has nothing at all to
do with fable, and, more importantly, scholars disagree over what ought to count as a ‘real
fable’, both in the Life and beyond. Moreover, even in the few instances where there is
universal agreement that this is precisely what Aesop is doing, there is still the fact that the
reader is not being told a fable so much as reading a representation of a scene offable-
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As we will see below, there are numerous ways in which Aesop’s behaviors and
communications in the Life are shaped by the particular audience he is addressing,
and, more generally, by the conditions and exigencies of his status." But first we
will look briefly at two particularly revealing examples of the connections be
tween slavery, freedom, and the manner in which Aesop communicates his wis
dom: the episode that culminates in Aesop gaining his freedom {Vita G 83-89)
and the one in which Aesop returns to Samos after his ambassadorial visit to Lydia

{Vita G 100).
The first passage is Vita G 83-89, which exploits the semantic range of Xboiqterms in ways that cormect Aesop’s ability to interpret signs (Tf)v too oripeiou
X,uoiv XnPeiv, Vita G 83) with his being unshackled (X.ijaaT£ auxov. Vita G 83).
As Aesop’s master Xanthus puts it: T am freeingyou so you can solve the portent’
{ak)M M® tss iva Kul oi3 xi ^uot|c. Vita G 83). In the ensuing passages, links be
tween Aesop’s slave status and his wisdom are further developed by forms of
A,uai(;/A.u«), with the result that Aesop ends up agreeing to perform a public X.uok;
(‘interpretation’) of a portent for the Samian people only if he is first granted his
A,uoiq (‘freedom’) once and for all {Vita G 89):
avSpeq Sdpioi, ouk eoxiv suXoyov 8ouA,ov eA^oOepcp dfipcp oripslov 5iaA,i3oaaOai- 60SV nepiOexe poi xfiv <xrav> eipripevoiv rtapppaiav, iva sdv
emxux® ®(; 8A£i308poq xaq np87ionoaq xipdq d7toA,dP(o, edv 5e dpdpxco pp (bq
5ouA,oi;, aXk’ (bq 8X£u08po(; KoA.ao0o». edv onv epoi xf|v napprioiav xfjq eX^n0epla(; nepiOrixe, pexd Tcdoriq dSeiaq dp^opai Aeyeiv.

telling. Everywhere in the Life Aesop is shown performing his wisdom for partieular ad
dressees in partieular situations, and in eaeh instanee the fable-telling - or the riddling, or
the manipulating of objeets, or the gesturing - is framed by details about the performer’s
own goals and motivations and the effects the performance has on the audience.
'' A number of recent studies have attended to links between the evolution of Aesop’s speech
and his rise in social status. See especially Adrados 1979, 1981; Holzberg 1993, 1996;
Kurke 2011; Jouanno 2011, 110-111. Aesop’s ‘rise’ in status has been approached from
numerous scholarly perspectives. Recent studies have shown how the Life sheds light on
the conditions of slavery and manumission in antiquity (Hopkins 1993, Ragone 1997, and
duBois 2003); while others have shown how changes in Aesop’s communication help to
plot the overall structure and design of the Life as a whole; cf. Mignogna 1992, Holzberg
1993, and Ferrari 1997. Still others have read Aesop’s ‘rise’ in status as revealing of central
tensions in Greek culture and ideology (Kurke 2003, 2011) or indicative of the Life's par
ticipation in broader Greek discourse on the nature and development of human speech
(Ferrari 1997, Hunter 2007). There have also been a number of studies that have empha
sized the role of Isis and the Muses in granting Aesop the slave a voice (Winkler 1985,
Finkelpearl 2003, Dillery 1999; cf Hunter 2007).
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Men of Samos, it doesn’t make good sense for a slave to interpret a portent
for a free people. So, grant me freedom of speech for what I have to say. That
way, if 1 am right, I may get the honors due to a free man. And if I am wrong,
1 won’t be punished as a slave but as a free man. If, then, you grant me free
dom of speech, I will go ahead and speak fearlessly.
The Samian demos demands that Xanthus grant Aesop freedom (ct^ioupEV oe,
SdvGs, eXeuOepcooov xov A’vocojiov, Vita G 89) so that he can perform his inter
pretation (5iaMoao0ai). Soon after his successful interpretation of the portent,
Aesop addresses a fable on the subject of slavery and freedom (the story of ‘The
Two Ro2ids’) to the people of Samos (Vita G 94), the first fable he tells in the Life.
As 1 will suggest below, the fact that Aesop’s switch to formal fable-telling occurs
after he has negotiated for parrhesia and eleutheria suggests a connection be
tween literary fables - of the sort that circulated in antiquity under Aesop’s name
- and the conditions of freedom. Moreover, the timing retroactively implies that
Aesop’s earlier performances of wisdom were shaped and conditioned by his en
slavement. Indeed, as we will see, a particularly revealing aspect of Aesop’s ne
gotiations above is his insistence that he not be subject to physical abuse (dXA,’ (be;

eX^hOepoq KoX,ao0o6, Vita G 89) if his interpretation turns out to be wrong.
The second passage is Vita G 100, in which the description of Aesop writing
and archiving his fables in Lydia occurs in a general atmosphere of celebration
and memorializing. Immediately after writing, Aesop returns to Samos trium
phantly (Vita G 100):
A’focDTiOi; ouv auxra ouyYpa\|/(ipevoq xouq idionq ^oyouq kuI puOouq, xohq d/pi
Kttl vBv ovopa^opevouq, KaxsX-incv eiq xqv Pip^ioOrjicriv Kul ArxP(bv jtapet xou
PamJtecix; emoxoAdq [eyevexo JuxA,iv] Jtpoi; xouq Sapfoui;, ev0a (bpo^Ei Kaxri5Jidx0ou at)TOi<; ^ekev xou AiocoTion, noXkh, 5e 8ropa Kopiodpsvoq, enA^uoev eii; Sdpov. kuI EKicA.qofav cruoTriodpEVoq dvEyveo xdq ETiioxoAdq xou PaoiMcoq. oi 8e Sdpioi yvtovxEq auxoiq xov Kpoioov 5iqA.Adx9“i^

AiodjTiou xipdq auxra £\|/ri9foavxo, Kai SKdAEoav xov xonov ekeTvov AiocbTiEiov, onov qv EvqAAxxypEvoq. 6 6e AiooTOq Ouoaq xaiq Mouoau; lEpov kuxeOKEuaoEV auxaiq, OTijoaq pEoov auxrav Mvqpoauvqv, ouk ATioAAcova. 6
AtcoAAoov opyio0Eli; auxco dx; x® Mapouq.
Then Aesop wrote down the stories and fables that go by his name even now
and deposited them in the library. When he had gotten from the king a letter
wherein he agreed to make peace with the Samians for the sake of Aesop, he
sailed for Samos, taking many gifts with him. He called an assembly and read

238

JEREMY B. LEFKOWITZ

the king’s letter. The Samians, recognizing that Croesus had made peace with
them for the sake of Aesop, voted honors for him and named the place where
he had been turned over the Aesopeion. As for Aesop, he sacrificed to the
Muses and then built a shrine to them, erecting in their midst a statue of Mne
mosyne and not of Apollo. Thereupon Apollo became angry with him as he
had once been with Marsyas.*^
The text appears to go out of its way to advertise Aesop’s newfound prestige,
underlining that the free and celebrated sage is emphatically no longer Aesop the
hideously ugly slave, who for the first two thirds of the narrative was relentlessly
disrespected, maltreated, and beaten {Vita G 1-89). Further acknowledgements of
Aesop’s status as a sage frame the passage: upon meeting him, Croesus recognizes
Aesop as someone who possesses a universal kind of knowledge (npoc; Tf|v ei(;
Toix; dvGpwTOix; tuxriv X,6you(; eijisTv, ‘tell me stories of the ways of fortune with
men’, Vita G 99);*^ after he departs Samos, Aesop ‘tours the world’ (n£pi£A,0Eiv
xfiv oiKoup^v, Vita G 101), ‘lectures to audiences for a fee’ (npripaxa 5e
dpyopiKd XxxpPdvoav, Vita G 101), and is named ‘chamberlain’ (ETioiitoEV aiixov
ETcl xfj(; dioucrjoEox;, Vita G 101) of King Lycurgus in Babylon. Thus the writing
of Aesop’s fables becomes conflated with other supposedly lasting honors (npdc;),
and with permanent signs of Aesop’s beneficence on Samos, such as the naming
of the ‘Aesopeion’ and the erection of a shrine to the Muses.'^*
In what follows, 1 will claim that the Life maps Aesop’s experiences of en
slavement and freedom onto his evolution into a fable-teller in ways that suggest
an analogy to the differences between oral and written literature. This does not
amount to a claim that the historical or ideological dimensions of slavery or of the
Life ofAesop as a text are unimportant; far from suggesting that we ignore socio
political realities, 1 am only suggesting that we attend more closely to the ways in
The apparent snubbing of Apollo and the eomparison with Marsyas have received much
attention, especially in light of Aesop’s imminent, fatal confrontation with the Delphians.
See Wiechers 1961, Jedrkiewicz 1989, Compton 1990, and now Kurke 2011.
The point is that Croesus somehow knows to ask Aesop to ‘tell stories of the ways of
fortune with men’ ( Vita G 99), rather than asking him for help with any particular problem.
Aesop obliges, telling a tale about a cicada and adding, in a passage that undoubtedly is
intended to echo the opening of the text (Kita G 1), that he (Aesop) ‘speaks words of commonsense and benefits the life of humans’ ((ppevf|pT| (pBeyyopai ptov tmv pspoTKOV
(bcpekcov. Vita G 99).
The concept of the ‘archive’, as theorized within various disciplines, including especially
social anthropology and performance studies, is helpful for thinking through the co-occur
rence of acts of writing and memorializing. See especially Foucault 1972, Derrida 1995,
Velody 1998, Voss and Wemer 1999, Bradley 1999, and Manoff2004. For the complex
relationship between the ‘archive’ and ‘repertoire’, see Taylor 2003.
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which the Life thematizes slavery and freedom in its reflections on communica
tion and on the production, transmission, and reception of Aesopica. Aesop’s con
cerns for his physical safety in his negotiations with the Samian people {Vita G
83-89) and the association of ‘Aesop’s fables’ with other fixed, lasting signs of
Aesop’s wisdom {Vita G 99-101), reflect a larger pattern in the Zi/e, according to
which two distinct types of Aesopic storytelling are systematically differentiated:
the enslaved and the free. The former involves an emphasis on the physical pres
ence of Aesop, his impromptu responses to the context in which he finds himself,
and the manipulation of language and signs to turn the tables against his addressee(s), usually his master {Vita G 1 -89); the latter involves the telling of actual
fables, having recognizable formal features and content {Vita G 94-142). While
Aesop’s body figures prominently in representations of storytelling during the pe
riod of his enslavement, after he has earned his freedom and formally written
down his fables in Lydia, a related but distinct type of corpus-based storytelling
obtains, as the slave’s ingenious use of his body is replaced by the free fabulist s
apparent command of an established collection of fables.'^

3. Performances During Aesop’s Enslavement
Practically all of Aesop’s actions during the period of his enslavement {Vita G 189) are reactions: his performances are crafted in response to the immediate cir
cumstances in which he finds himself.'® In a few instances, Aesop is simply asked
a question, by his master Xanthus or by Xanthus’ wife, to which he responds di
rectly with a kind of aetiology.'’ More typically, however, Aesop the slave is
given an order or threatened in some way, and he reacts by staging an improvised,
lesson-bearing performance. That is, Aesop discovers, over and over again, a way
to resist or challenge his master’s threats and commands by manipulating matters
in such a way that his master - and anyone else within earshot - ends up learning

'5 Significantly, after Aesop is freed we hear almost nothing about his body. One exception
is the description of Aesop as ‘dirty, long-haired, and pale’ (^ohvroq Kai KoprovToq Kui
wxptovTO?, Vita G 107), after a period of imprisonment in Babylon; but these temporary
effects on his appearance appear to have nothing to do with Aesop’s famous ugliness,
which receives much attention in Vita G 1 -89. On the meaning(s) of Aesop’s ugliness, see
especially Jedrkiewicz 1989, Lissarague 2000, Lefkowitz 2008, and Kurke 2011.
See Rosen 2007 on the ways in which Aesop’s reactions are typical of ancient satirists.
At Vita G 33, Aesop explains the origins of dreams to Xanthus’ wife, and, at 67, he explains
to Xanthus why people bother to look at their own defecation; cf. 68, in which Aesop
intervenes in a fight between Xanthus and his fellow philosophers with an account of Di
onysus’ invention of wine.
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a kind of ‘lesson’. Either implicitly or explicitly, the lesson taught usually in
volves matters related to the proper and improper treatment of slaves. In these
sections of the Life, our attention is drawn to the improvisational character of Ae
sop’s wisdom in numerous ways. Above all, it is the embedded character of these
performances in both the immediate circumstances and in the broader context of
Aesop’s enslavement that differentiates them from the types of performances en
acted by Aesop the free man.
The programmatic stolen-fig episode {Vita G + W 2-3), with which the Life
opens, is typical of the slave Aesop’s ability to discover novel ways to resist those
who seek to do him harm despite his utter powerlessness. Characteristically, Ae
sop uses all he has - namely, his body - to turn the tables on his adversaries and
save his own skin.’^ Briefly, what happens is this; Aesop’s first master, whose
name we do not learn, asks his servant (oiKETiit;, Vita W 2) Agathopous to look
after some recently-acquired figs. Agathopous and another slave decide instead to
eat the figs themselves and blame it on Aesop, whom they describe as ‘good for
nothing but a whipping’ (ot)6^ alia npcjici anxro si pf] bepeoGai, Vita G 2). As
soon as he is summoned before his master and learns he has been accused, Aesop
‘knows he will get a beating’ (peXAcov bafpeoGai, Vita G 3). Although unable to
speak (XaMv 8e pf| Swapcvoq, Vita G 3), Aesop manages to persuade his master
to hold off punishment and, using only gestures, asks for a bowl of warm water
(5id xfflv v8updx(ov pxrjOEV bScop j^^iapov. Vita G 3), which is described (signifi
cantly) as being ‘at hand’ (jiapaKefpsvov). Aesop drinks the water, forces himself
to vomit, and proves his innocence through his resourcefulness (5id 8e xfjq 7coA,ujtEipfaq, Vita G 3). This dramatic and physical expression of Aesop’s Tio^uTCEipfa
is programmatic in the sense that it introduces and models one of the legendary
fabulist’s defining characteristics: namely, his ability to take whatever he can find
‘at hand’ (TiapaKefpEvov) and, through a process of creative adaptation, transform
it into what we might call, for lack of a better term, a teachable moment. Although
mute, Aesop again manages to communicate that the other slaves should do as he
did (xouxo fi^uBoe xal xoxx; onv8onXx)U(; anxou jioifjoai. Vita G 3). They promptly
vomit up their guilt and are beaten in turn, learning the ‘lesson’ - which is articu
lated in the spirit if not the form of a conventional epimythium - that those who
scheme up trouble for others only bring trouble upon themselves.’^
While Aesop’s initial muteness makes his vulnerable body and his non-verbal
gestures more prominent than they are after he gains the ability to speak at Vita G**

** Aesop is introduced in Vita G 1 as ‘speechless ... dumb, and unable to talk’, but he is later
visited in a dream by Isis and granted the gift of speech in Vita G 6-8.
5ep6pevot 8e eKCivot eyvtoaav aatpak&c, 6xi 6 Kata aXXou ptixaveuopevoi; kokov ainbc,
Ka0’ EauTov) TOUTO XovGdvEi woicov {Vita G 3).
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7-8,^° the situation as it unfolds in the stolen-fig episode is analogous to a number
of episodes in Vita G 1-89. Moreover, the slave Aesop’s body - particularly in its
susceptibility to physical abuse - remains a significant element in his perfor
mances throughout the period of his enslavement. The pattern that emerges is this:
Aesop is threatened in some way; although powerless, Aesop makes use of some
thing ‘at hand’ and somehow parlays it into a lesson-bearing performance. The
threat is not always explicit (see below), but every command or task Aesop’s first
master or second master, Xanthus {Vita G 28-90), gives him is given under the
implicit threat of physical punishment.
Over time Xanthus comes to see Aesop’s quick thinking and improvisational
skills as assets. After hearing him respond to the mistress’ question about the na
ture of dreams {Vita G 33-34), Xanthus realizes that Aesop ‘quickly finds the right
thing to say’ (eupacnAoyoi;, Vita G 34).^' Xanthus himself is described as unable
on the spur of the moment to find answers to a philosophical conundrum (6 HdvOoq dKouoaq (piXooocpou pav ^f|XTipa, pf| eupioKcav auxo 8e TaxECoq dvaA,uoai, Vita
G 35),^^ but when he acknowledges Aesop’s sharp wit (dyxivoiaq. Vita G 70),^^
he seeks to benefit from his slave’s special gifts and he asks for help.^"* Moreover,
Aesop, for his part, seems to be well aware of his own improvisational skill set,
and in the same terms described by the narrator and other characters: beoTtoxa, si
XI Tispl XoyiKoi) ^T|xf|paxoq, sxoipcoq sx® dTioKpivaoGai (‘Master, if it is a question
of words, 1 am ready with answers’. Vita G 84); s;nA,uoopai syd) Kal suKaipcoq
7ipoaicA,T10f|oopai Xsyeiv (‘I’ll have a solution, and at the proper moment’. Vita G
85).
Thus the link between Aesop’s improvisational skills and the circumstances
of his enslavement is inscribed in the Life ofAesop from the very beginning, and
in such a way as to mark the slave’s performances of wisdom as fundamentally
bound to his condition. Aesop’s slave status frames and determines the direction
of these performances. Indeed, the motivation behind Aesop’s actions is often to
resist or to challenge his master. This is most evident in a series of scenes in which

On Aesop’s receipt of the gift of speech from Isis, see Winkler 1985, Finkelpearl 2003,
Dillery 1999; cf. Hunter 2007.
Cf eoemvoTiTov (‘sharp thinker’). Vita G 72.
^ Cf Vita G 82, where Xanthus’ inability to think and act quickly is described in the follow
ing terms: 6 6e HdvGoi; ecrtri su; t6 pfeov Kal pT)8^ euptoKcov Kaxd vouv eijteiv eXaPev
Sioptav ojicog TO oripeiov ETtiX-ucrn (‘Xanthus came forward and, unable to discover any
thing to say, requested time to interpret the portent’).
Cf St sSpdorepoi; Kai ouveioq, ‘you are such a good guesser and so smart’. Vita G 79; oh
peya Saipoviov ei, ‘you are a great genius’. Vita G 80.
Sfepal aou, AiotoTte, ei 5uvax6v ooi <5id> xfji; aeauxon dyxivoiaq, edpav xwa npdtpacnv,
8i’ fj^ vucfiaio fj xd<; aovOfiKac 5uiX,uaouai, Vita G 70.
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Aesop repeatedly disobeys and embarrasses Xanthus by putting excessive pres
sure on the precision of his master’s commands and interpreting them so literally
that the words lose their intended meaning. In the first scene {Vita G 38), Xanthus
orders Aesop to take an oil flask and towels (apov em x£ip®v oou kfjicuGov kevnd
T8) in order to accompany him to the bath. Aesop reacts by deciding to teach his
master a lesson; ‘Masters who show an unnecessarily stem attitude about the ser
vice they want have themselves to blame for the trouble they get into. I’ll teach
this philosopher a lesson in how to give orders’Aesop then picks up the oil
flask - without putting oil in it - and follows his master. When Xanthus asks for
his oil flask and realizes there is nothing in it, he asks, ‘Aesop, where is the oil?’
(AiocoTtc, TO ekaiov too; Vita G 38). Aesop’s response is as follows:

“siq oiKov.” 6 SotvGoq ksysi “6id tI;” Aiooojroi; ksyei “oti ou pot eiTiag ‘apov
kf)Ko0ov Kai Xevna’, shxiov 8e ouk eijca(;. e5ei onv pE ppbEv x®v EipppEvrov
nXsov JcoiEiv ejceI ion vopou ocpakEix; Tiktiydav ■ujtEuOnvoq p priv.” Kai ev toutco

“At home”. Xanthus said, “Why is that”? Aesop said, “Because you told me
‘Take an oil flask and towels’, but you did not say ‘oil’. I was not supposed
to do anything more than what you said; since if I messed up my command I
would pay for it with a beating”. And with that he was silent.
Our attention is drawn to the ways in which Aesop discovers how to make creative
use of all he has to work with - his master’s exact words (apov kf|KU0ov xal
kevna) and the objects involved (e.g., kf|KO0ov), which Aesop has ‘in hand’ (ejcI
XEipwv) - to assert himself and prove a point.^^ Adaptation and appropriation of
the immediate context are vital components of improvisation, and utterly neces
sary for the slave who has no possessions - none, that is, except his body, which
the entire performance is designed to try to protect (ejieI ton vopon ocpakciq

oi T(p vro TtepOTiKpoi nepl SiaKoviav SecmoTai KaKoSaipovtag eavTOii; ytvovrai Ttapamoi.
eym toutov tov cpikooocpov 7tai8e6a(0, iva pdGti kox; amdv 8d emxdxTeiv, Gta G 38.
Almost identical exchanges occur in subsequent scenes, as when Aesop is told to bring
Xanthus a footbath, but, as Aesop remarks, he is not told (ook eiTtei;) to put water in it or
to wash his master’s feet (Afoowtog keyei ‘einag ‘jiapdGeg kacdvriv’, ouk sotsc ‘Pdke u5cop
Kol vt\|/ov pon xoug noSag’, Vita G 4G); when Aesop is told to ‘cook lentil for dinner’, but
not told (on ydp poi eiTiag) to cook ‘lentils’, for ‘the one is singular and the other is plural
(Alarortog Xeyei ‘vat, on vdo uoi eutac 6xi “(paxov e\|/r|oov’’ Kai on (paxong; 6 psv ydp ecmv
eviKog, oi 5e 7ckr|GnvxiKot’, Vita G 41). Again, as Vita G 51, a typically vague command
from Xanthus motivates Aesop to say to himself; ‘I will show him not to give me moronic
orders’ (Ataomog Jipog eanxov keyei ‘eyd) anxm 5et^(o pcopd pf) 8iaxdxxeaGai’).
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nX.Tjyrav ■f)ji£i30t)vo<^ T^fiTiv). Whether it is deliberately forgetting to bring oil to the
bath or cooking inappropriate meals by deliberately misconstruing Xanthus in
structions (see note 26), Aesop’s repeated subversions of his master’s authority
are marked in the text in different ways: at Vita G 64, Xanthus describes Aesop’s
insubordination as ‘game-playing’ (apTtai^cov) and begs Aesop to become a welldisposed slave (dpKEi EpTiaiCcov poi, A-fj^ov to Xxnrtov kuI EuvoiKrai; poi 6o6>ieue);
at Vita G 54, Xanthus laments Aesop’s determination to ‘turn (my) words around’
(Td av(o Kdi® 5uxX£w); finally, at Vita G 55, one of Xanthus’ students calls Aesop
an ‘abusive and malicious slave’ (cpiloAxiiSopoq xai KaKEvrpExfi<; 6on^q ouxoq)
and describes his efforts to ‘drive (his master) crazy’ (Tayecoc^ oe eIi; paviav TiEpiXpEVj/El).

The necessity that Aesop figure out a way to make creative use of his master’s
orders or ‘whatever is at hand’ reflects, on some level, the powerlessness and
helplessness of his position?'^ As a slave, subject to physical abuse at every turn,
Aesop’s body is utterly vulnerable. Recent scholarship has drawn attention to the
important role of Aesop’s body in the Life ofAesop from a number of different
critical perspectives.^* Here I do not wish to focus on corporeality per se, rather,
I want to focus on bodies in order to draw attention to the degree to which Aesop’s
lesson-bearing performances in Vita G 1-89 are grounded in the physical, material
situation in which he finds himself Indeed, it is no exaggeration to claim that
Aesop’s improvisational wisdom in Vita G 1-89 is dependent on the presence of
bodies - both his own and those of his addressees - and on the particular circum
stances in which these bodies find themselves.
There are two primary ways in which bodies figure in Aesop’s performances
of wisdom in Vita G 1-89. First, the body and bodily functions feature prominently
as themes of the slave Aesop’s performances. As a result, Aesop often uses his
own body and the bodies of others to prove a point or to communicate. Second,
the utter precariousness of Aesop’s slave body is always felt and shapes the per
formances in fundamental ways. After considering some manifestations of the
body in Aesop’s performances in Vita G 1-89,1 am going to claim that all of these

2'' Indeed, this essential powerlessness is preeisely what Leslie Kurke’s reeent work on Aesop
has brought to the fore. Borrowing Claude Levi-Strauss’ notion of the ‘eultural bricoleur ,
Kurke claims that Aesop is a ‘culture hero for those who feel themselves disempowered,
so his ability to extort the self-incrimination of the powerful functions as a wish-fulfillment
fantasy (or how-to guide) for the marginal or weaker members of society’ (Kurke 2011,
200). Kurke’s reading of Aesopic bricolage focuses on the outward, ideological potential
ities of the Life of Aesop', but there is more to be said about the ways in which the link
between slavery and improvisation in the Life sheds light on the inner workings of the
narrative and, I would claim, on the literary history of the Aesopic tradition writ large.
2* Lissarague 2000; duBois 2003; Lefkowitz 2008; Kurke 2011.
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heavily embodied performances stand in contrast to representations of Aesop’s
fable-telling in Vita G 90-142, in which the significance of bodies is far less
marked and in which Aesop’s own style of wisdom begins to take on some of the
characteristics of the disembodied literary artifact.
Throughout the first half of the Life of Aesop, our attention is repeatedly
drawn to Aesop’s hideous body and to his use of his own body and the bodies of
others to make a point or otherwise communicate. Indeed, bodies are the primary
tools of Aesop’s improvisation, and much of Aesop’s demonstration of wit in
these chapters either involves bodies directly (vomiting at, e.g.. Vita G 2-3; defe
cating, at Vita G 67) or is presented in the context of others’ reactions to seeing
Aesop’s body, whether it is his ugliness (e.g., at Vita G 11, 15, 27, 55, 87-88) or
Xanthus’ wife seeing him naked (Vita G 75-76). Other times a reaction is trig
gered by Aesop’s observation of the bodies and bodily functions of others, such
as Xanthus’ public urination (Vita G 28) or his mistress’ exposed ass (Vita G 77).
Bodies and bodily functions figure less explicitly but no less significantly when
Aesop is charged with the care of his master’s body (oil flask for the bath. Vita G
38; water for foot-bath. Vita G 40) or assisting with his master’s eating and drink
ing (figs. Vita G 2-4; shopping for vegetables. Vita G 34; preparing lentil. Vita G
39; serving bathwater to drink. Vita G 40; serving pig’s feet for dinner. Vita G 4243; preparing food for dog, not mistress. Vita G 44-50; cooking tongue for dinner.
Vita G 51-55; attending a drinking party. Vita G 68 f.; helping Xanthus ‘drink the
sea dry’. Vita G 70-74).
Aesop’s own body is, from the beginning of the Life, one of his primary
modes of communication, both intentionally (through deliberate gestures) and un
intentionally (through others’ responses to his ugliness, his nudity, etc.). As we
have observed, it is through gestures (8id xo&v veupdxcov) that Aesop is able to
prove his innocence in the stolen-fig episode. Similarly, in his interactions with a
priestess of Isis (Vita G 4-7), which lead directly to Aesop being granted the gifts
of speech (Vita G 7), Aesop uses ‘gestures’ (fjp^axo biaveueiv. Vita G 4) to ask
her if she has lost her way, then ‘leads her by the hand’ (ejnXapPdvexai xfjq
auxfic; Ktti pyaysv. Vita G 4) to a grove where he offers her food before ‘leading
her again’ (6 5s "nyaysv auxf|v. Vita G 5) and ‘pointing out’ (Ssl^aq, Vita G 5) the
proper road. There is an almost comic exaggeration of what Aesop is able to com
municate with non-verbal gestures: we are told that Aesop ‘began to nod (to the
priestess) as if to say “Why have you left the road and come to the farm?”’ (pp^axo
SiavEueiv xal 8T)koTv ‘5id xi djio^uiouoa xfiv drjpooiav 656v eiq xouxo x6 Kxfjpa
8ioe^f)A,u0aq;’ Vita G 4). Later (Vita G 9), in the same vein, when the overseer
Zenas learns that Aesop can now talk, he fears the consequences:
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OT8 yap sTi vco56(; Tjv 5i£V£d^ poi 6xi ‘eav 8X,0ti 6 580TOTr)(; pou psxaoxfioa)
08 xfj(; oiKovopiac;- Kaxpyopf)oa) ydp oou 5id xmv vsDiidxcov.’ 8i ow v8dnaoiv
87criyy8i^axo, noXk& paXAov Inlxbv 7C8io8i.
When he was still mute he would gesture to me as if to say ‘If my master
eomes I’ll have you removed from your position; I will accuse you by means
of gestures.’ If, then, he would bring charges against me with gestures, how
much more persuasive will he be speaking!
Such aggrandizement of the communicatory powers of Aesop’s gestures also has
the effect of establishing a connection between all of Aesop’s performances.^^ It
is as if the power of speech merely intensifies Aesop’s communicative abilities
rather than simply marking a replacement of the physical with the verbal.^®
From the beginning, the mute Aesop’s physical vulnerability is linked to his
complete dependence upon his body for communication. As we have seen, the
fellow slaves who conspire to frame Aesop in the programmatic stolen-fig epi
sode, describing him as ‘good for nothing but a beating’ (oudev aXko KpenEX am&
8i pf) 58p8o0ai), do so knowing that Aesop will be beaten precisely because he
cannot speak.^' As Corinne Jouanno has observed, the persistent violence against
Aesop’s body increases the reader’s emotional involvement in the narrative.^^ But
the threat of violence also frames and determines Aesop’s actions in more funda
mental ways. The reader is constantly reminded in Vita G 1-89 that his master
may beat Aesop at anytime.^^ Moreover, Aesop and his master are presented as
fully aware of the stakes: at Vita G 38, Aesop’s show of resistance against the
strict language of his master’s orders is carried out with the knowledge that he is

There are also hints of a more profound commitment to the signifying powers of bodies in
the Life. For example, throughout the entire scene on the auction block {Vita G 20-27),
when Xanthus purchases Aesop, there is frequent reference to bodies, including detailed
descriptions of each slave’s body and dress {Vita G 21), and a number of evaluative com
ments {Vita G 21, 23, 26); indeed, Xanthus explicitly encourages onlookers to view the
display of bodies as a kind of philosophical problem {Vita G 22): pf) vopftniTe xf|v (pikoaorpfav Sid Xbycov povov oucrcdvai, aXka Kai Sid xcov spyiov. Cf Lefkowitz 2008.
Cf Vita G 13: f| Se Kaxaarpoipfi aoTon xi; dip’ on qp^axo laXdv Tiepfepyoq yeyovev (‘What
is to become of him (Aesop)? From the moment he started talking he has been trouble’).
6 Se Afaonioi; XnA^iv pq Suvdpevoq onxcoq Sapqaexai, Kai xqv emOupiov oon ei TtenkqpojKiix; (‘Since Aesop cannot speak he will be beaten, and you’ll get just what you desire’),
Vita G 2. Moreover, before Aesop improvises his defense, he himself is said to have real
ized he will get a beating (psXXtov SafpeoOai).
Jouanno 2006, 39 note 17. Cf Hopkins 1993, 15 note 23, on fear and physical punishment
in the Life ofAesop.
“ Vita G 2, 3, 42, 50, 56, 58, 77, 80, and 83.
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susceptible to physical violence if he does not perform well (eSei ow pa pp6^
T®v eiprip^cflv jtXaov jioieiv ejcsl ton vopon ocpaAal; jcA,pymv UTiehGuvoc; ppT|v).
Later {Vita G 42), when Xanthus becomes frustrated and embarrassed by his
slave’s insubordinate challenges, he attempts ‘to find some pretext to thrash him’
(6 HdvGoq ^T|Tmv cupoppfiv 5i’ pq paoxiymoei xov Aiocotiov). In addition, there are
times when Aesop cannot figure out a way to avoid physical abuse, despite his
obvious blamelessness: for example, he is ‘thoroughly beaten’ (Eddpri empsA^q)
at Vita G 77, when he reports two crows outside but Xanthus only sees one (one
flew away); and at Vita G 80, Xanthus orders Aesop to be ‘bound and locked up’
(ekeAeuoev auxov 8E0£vxa ouyKAEiaOfjvai) despite Aesop’s success in decoding
an epitaph and discovering a buried treasure of gold for his master.^'* Thus even
when Aesop can communicate cogently and eloquently, his actions are deter
mined and constrained by the fundamental vulnerability of the conditions of en
slavement.

4. Representations ofFable-Telling After Manumission
As we have seen, for the duration of his enslavement the text repeatedly highlights
the ways in which Aesop must draw directly on his surroundings to improvise his
performances. But once the fabulist is no longer a slave - no longer subject to the
threats and abuse of a master - his wisdom begins to take on many of the qualities
of the disembodied literary artifact. One gets the sense that the free Aesop is in
command of a kind of corpus, from which he can draw on occasion to advise or
warn his addressee(s). This is partly a product of the many links between his
words in these sections and familiar material in the extant corpora of the ancient
fable tradition.^^ But even without these demonstrable connections there are a
Vita G 79-80. Although Xanthus praises Aesop’s quick wit and wisdom {Vita G 79), and
calls him a ‘genius’ {Vita G 80), Aesop loses in the end. Aesop generates multiple inter
pretations of the jumbled lehers in an attempt to manipulate the lying Xanthus to keep his
promise, but ultimately Xanthus does not share the gold or grant Aesop freedom - instead
he binds him and locks him up.
This includes two ‘elassic’ fables that were well known in antiquity and frequently ascribed
to Aesop both in- and outside of the collections (cf. van Dijk 1995, 135), both of which
appear in remarkably similar form in the Collectio Augustana: ‘Eagle and Dung Beetle’ (=
Perry 3), at Vita G 135-139, and ‘Wolves and Sheep’ (= Perry 153), at Vita G 97. The
‘Eagle and Dung Beetle’ also surfaces three times in the Aristophanic corpus: Wasps 14461448; Lysistrata 691-695; Peace 127-134; cf. also Lucian, lean 10, 134-139. For ‘Wolves
and Sheep’, cf. Plu. Dem. 23,5; Babr. 93; Aphth. 21; Ademar 43; Rom. Anglicus 31
(Hervieux 1893-1899, 2:586). Other fables Aesop tells in the Life that are attested in the
collections are: ‘Cicada’ {Vita G 99); ‘Widow and Plowman’ {Vita G 129; cf. the story of
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number of ways in which our attention is drawn to patterns and internal consistt
encies in his stories, contributing to a sense that there are certain fixed and tradi
tional types of stories the free Aesop tells. Indeed, the nine stories Aesop tells in
the Life that scholars most commonly acknowledge as ‘fables’ all appear in Vita
G 90-142; ‘Two Roads’ (94); ‘Wolves and Sheep’ (97); ‘Cicada’ (99); ‘Widow
and Plowman’ (129); ‘Simple-minded Daughter’ (131); ‘Mouse and Frog’ (133);
‘Eagle and Dung Beetle’ (135-139); ‘Farmer’ (140); ‘Father and Daughter’
(141).^^ Other passages in the later scenes of the Life ofAesop, including the ex
tended borrowing from the Aramaic Life ofAhiqar (Vita G 101-123), also repre
sent the free Aesop as possessing a kind of storehouse of wisdom. While his words
of advice and warning in these sections remain apposite to the situations in which
he finds himself, they are nevertheless detachable from their contexts and coher
ent as standalone narratives in ways that vomiting figs or playing tricks with oil
flasks are not.
The free Aesop’s words consistently display a surprising number of distinct
narrative elements and structural features, which, in combination with one

the ‘Widow of Ephesus’, found also in Petronius 111-112, and PhaedrusTpp. 15); ‘Simpleminded Daughter’ (Vita G 129); ‘Mouse and Frog’ (Vita G 133; cf. Batrachomyomachia
10-104; Ademar 4, Odo 21b).
5*’ Taking into account variations in the different recensions of the Life of Aesop and m the
heterogeneous sets of criteria used to determine what counts as a legitimate fable , schol
ars generally agree that Aesop only begins to tell proper fables once he has gained his
freedom; cf. Nojgaard 1964,471; Holzberg 1992,1996; Hagg 1997,179; Pervo 1998,104;
Shiner 1998, 162; Hunter 2007, 55. But, to be sure, there has been disagreement among
scholars on the matter of just how many proper fables are to be found in the Life ofAesop.
While the most common total count of fables in the Life ofAesop is nine (see above) as in
Nojgaard 1964, 471, and Holzberg 1992, 1996 (cf. Shiner 1998, 162), Perry 1952 seems
to count twelve. Two of these - Perry 3 and Perry 153 - are omitted from the section m
Aesopica entitled ENUMERANTUR FABULAE NOVAE QUAE VlTAAESOPl TRADITAE
SUNT (‘Listing of new fables transmitted in the Life of Aesop') [Perry 379-388] for no
other reason than that they are known from the Collectio Augustana and thus not new .
Of Perry’s twelve, another two (Vita G 33, 67) occur during the period of Aesop s enslave
ment (see above). Van Dijk 1995 identifies thirteen fables in Vita G (twelve in Vita IF and
ten in the so-called Planudean vita) and Jouanno 2011 counts sixteen, dividing the total
into thirteen fables ‘en bonne et due forme' and three fables transformees' (105). Van
Dijk and Jouanno consider different material in Vita G 1-90 to count as ‘fable’, either be
cause it may find echoes in the fable collections or may be linked to known fables m other
ways. Both scholars also acknowledge and discuss the ways in which Aesop s fable-telling
in Vita G 90-142 is notably distinct from the earlier passages and has even closer and more
demonstrable links to the fable tradition. Thus, regardless of whether one’s definition of
‘fable’ leads to a count of nine, twelve, thirteen, or sixteen total fables in the Life, it is
widely acknowledged that there is something qualitatively different about Aesop’s manner
of story-telling after he has been freed.
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another, amount to a generic type of wisdom. Perhaps the clearest example of this
is the way in which Aesop now introduces his performances by announcing his
intention to ‘tell a fable’
or calling upon his addressee(s) to ‘listen to a
fable’The very first fable Aesop tells in the Li/e begins with a traditional and
indefinite ‘Once upon a time’ (iioxe),^'' while several others open by convention
ally setting the scene in a distant and imagined past when animals spoke the same
language as humans (e.g., kuG’ 6v Kaipov opoipcova poav xd
xou^ dvGpdutoiQ,
‘In the time when animals were homophonous with men’, Fita G 96).'’° The
themes and manner of characterization in these fables also repeat themselves and,
moreover, are typical in the tradition. For example, the conventionally vague ad
jective ‘some’ (xiq) to describe fable characters (animal or human) is used repeat
edly: ‘some cicada’ (xiva dKpiSa, Vita G 99), ‘some woman’ (yuvr] uq. Vita G
129; 130; Vita IT 141), and ‘some plowman’ (dpoxpuav xiq. Vita G 129)."^' In ad
dition, the fables the free Aesop tells also display what is perhaps the most dis
tinctive characteristic of the genre, the epimythium or ‘lesson’, which explicitly
spells out the relevance or ‘lesson’ of the fable.^^ To be sure, while a slave, Ae
sop’s wisdom performances often had a ‘lesson’ to teach (as we have seen, usually
directed at his master). But the structure and delivery of the epimythia appended
to each of the free Aesop’s stories are standardized in accordance with the formu
lae and conventions of the extant fable tradition.^*^

” Vita G 93, 96, 129, 130, 134, 141.
38 Vita G 132, 140.
3® Vita G 93; cf. 67. Cf. van Dijk 1995 and Jouanno 2011, 106.
The same formula appears in fable openings at Vita G 99 and 133. For this conventional
fable opening, cf. also X. Mem. 2,17,13; Call. Iamb. 2 (Pf. 192); Babr. ProL, Max. Tyr.
19. Cf. Karadagli 1981.
Some characters in these fables, such as the beetle and the cicada, are virtual celebrities in
the fable tradition. For the cicada in Aesopica, cf Perry 184 (‘The Ass and the Cicada ),
Perry 241 (‘The Cicada and the Fox’); Perry 373 (‘The Ant and the Cicada’; cf Babrius
140, Avianus 34, et al.); Perry 397 (‘The Bird Catcher and the Cicada’; cf Aphthonius 4);
Perty 470 = Plato’s Phaedrus 259b-c; Perry 507 (‘The Cricket and the Owl’; cf Phaedrus
42
43

3,16).
For the history of the epimythium and its significance in the genre, see espec. Perry 1940.
Vita G 97: s5ei 8s onv upaq <KaTd> xov puOov pp eircrj Tonq xprimoui; 7tapa8i56vai (‘Ac
cording to the fable, you should not rashly hand over useful men’); 99: draauTwi; Kdyd)
(‘Just so 1...’); 129: wcrre Kal cm (‘And you, too...’); 131: opoto? koI epol cmvePp, (pO£
(‘In the same way also it has turned out for me, friend...’); 133: opoicoi; Kdym, dvSpei^
djtoOavcbv upTv pdpoq eaopai (‘ In the same way also, in dying 1 will be death for you... ’);
139: opotoq Koi upeJi;, dv8pe? Aekcpioi, pf) dTipdcmxs to iepov (‘In the same way also you,
Delphians, do not dishonor the shrine... ’); 140: maauxcoq ow xdycb Suacpopcoq syco CSo it
is also that I am aggrieved...’); Vita W 141: xouxo xdyd) Jtpo?updq, w AeXxpoi (‘This also
I (feel) toward you, Delphians... ’).
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Let us now turn to look more closely at one of the fables Aesop tells in this
section, the fable of the ‘Frog and Mouse’ {Vita G 133), in order to observe how
these performances, although adapted to their contexts,'*^' are marked as traditional
material. These fables are not direct responses to questions posed by an interloc
utor or hyper-literal interpretations of a master’s commands; rather, as if drawing
upon an established store of pre-fabricated narratives, Aesop chooses and adapts
fables to fit the context by setting up various symbolic correspondences between
fable and the situation in which he finds himself. Aesop tells the ‘Frog and Mouse’
fable after he is informed by the Delphians that he is to be executed that very day
for the crimes of temple-robbery and blasphemy Understanding the severity of
the threat (AiocoTioq i5d)v auxoix; cucsiAoupevouq, Vita G 132-133), Aesop pre
sumably expects the fable to persuade the Delphians to change their minds:'*^

‘Xdvov dKouoaxe’. oi 5e £3i8xpE\|/av aikov Ittsw. 6 5e Afoconoq (prioiv {Vita
G 133] ‘oxe pv xd L&a ouowmva. pui; (piA,idoa(; Paxpa^q) eKciA£0£V auxov em
5emvov kuI eiOTiyayev auxov eic; xapieTov tiA,ouoiov tuxvu, 8(p’ ® qv dpxoq,
Kpsaq, xupoq, eAxiTai, ioxdSeg- kui cprioiv ‘eo01£.’
X,Ti(p0Elq 6 pdxpaxoq
(prioiv ‘eA0£ Kal cri) mp’ spoi 8£utvf|0(BV, iva oe KaXmq Mpra.’ dTupyayEV 6e
auxov Eiq Mpvriv xai cppoiv ‘KoA,uppr]oov.’ 6 5e puq- ‘KoA,upPfjoai ouk etxioxapai.’ 6 pdxpayoq- ‘syra oe 5i5d^o).’ Sfjoaq xe Mvcp xov Ji66a xou puoq Jtpoq
xov iSiov 7c68a [£8qoEv] <fj^xo Eiq xfiv X,ipvriv> xal xov puv soupEV. 6 8e puq
TxviyopEvoq euxev ‘vEKpoq o)v ^mvxd oe £K8iKfioco.’ xauxa Eijxovxoq auxou xaxa8uq 6 pdxpa^oq ejxvi^ev auxov. XEipEvou 8e auxou sm xou i38axoq xal smTiXEOvxoq, xopa^ qpTtaoEV xov puv ouv xo Paxpdx® ouv8£8£p£vov, xaxa(payd)v 8e xov puv s8pd^axo xai xou paxpdxou. ouxoac 6 uuc xov PdxpaYOv
£££8ixnoEV. ouofcoc xdYCQ, dv8o£c. d7to0avd)v uuiv uoooc soouav xal ydp Au8ioi, BaPu?i,ft)\aoi, xal oxe86v f| 'EXldq 6X.ri xov spov xapiiloovxai 0dvaxov.’
‘Listen to this story’. They permitted him to speak. Aesop said: [133] ‘When
all the animals spoke the same language, a mouse became friends with a frog
and invited him to dinner. Fie brought him to a richly-stocked storeroom, in
which there was bread, meat, cheese, olives, and dried figs. ‘Eat,’ he told him.
^ Van Dijk 1995.
'•5 Vita G 132: oi 8e A^ioi eiaeX,96vTeq Ttpoq xov Aiacojtov e(pT|aav ‘and Kpripvoi) oe 8ei
pX.Ti0fivai OTipepov- outox; ydp ae e\|;T|(piaap8v dveXeiv, d^iov ovxa <mq iep6cn)kov> xal
pXdocpTipov, iva pr|8e xacpfjq d^uoBfii;. exoipaaai aeauxov.’ (The Delphians came to Aesop
and said, ‘Today you must be thrown from the cliff. For this is the way we voted to kill
you, a temple-robber and blasphemer unworthy of burial. Prepare yourself).
For the historical and broader ideological implications of the Life's representation of Ae
sop’s confrontation with the Delphians, see espec. Wiechers 1961 and now Kurke 2011.
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Being received so hospitably, the frog said: ‘You should come to my place
for dinner, too, so I can give you a good reception!’ He led the mouse to his
pond and said ‘Dive ini’ But the mouse said, ‘I don’t know how to dive.’ So
the frog said, ‘I’ll teach you.’ Using a chord, he tied the mouse’s foot to his
own foot and, jumping into the pond, dragged the mouse behind. As he was
drowning, the mouse said, ‘Even though I am dead I will get revenge on you.’
As he said these words the frog went under water and drowned the mouse. As
he lay there, floating upon the surface of the water, a raven snatched up the
mouse, still tied to the frog, and after the raven ate the mouse he also ate up
the frog. This is how the mouse punished the frog. So. too, men of Delphi, in
death I shall be vour doom. For the Lydians, Babylonians, and almost all of
Greece will reap the harvest of my dying.’
On the one hand, there are a number of demonstrable formal and thematic links
to the fable tradition. The explicit announcement of the ‘fable’ (‘Xdyov
dKonoate’), the conventional opening (oxs rjv xd
opoqxova), and the formal
ized epimythium (onxcoq 6 png xov Paxpa^ov s^cdiicrioev. opoieog Kdycb, dv5peg,
djto0avd)v npTv popog eoopai) all mark the tale as traditional. The fable also treats
themes that are well attested both in- and outside ancient collections. As van Dijk
has shown, in representations of Aesop’s fable-telling in the Life, a connection
‘between the fable and both its direct context and the Life as a whole can be ob
served’."*^ Here I would like to extend Van Dijk’s study by emphasizing that there
is a significant difference between, on the one hand, a direct connection between
the specific circumstances in which Aesop finds himself and his particular perfor
mance, and, on the other hand, an indirect, symbolic connection - one that needs
to be explicitly drawn out and explained in order to make sense. In this case, ac
cording to the analogy set up by the fable, the mouse corresponds to the unjustly
murdered Aesop, the frog to the Delphians, and the raven to the avenging force
that punishes the guilty party; like the raven, the Babylonians, Lydians, and all of
Greece ‘will reap the harvest’ (KapTtioovxai) of Aesop’s death.
One of the many peculiarities of the composition of the Life ofAesop is the
extended borrowing (occurring at Vita G 101-123) of episodes from the vita of
the legendary Assyrian sage Ahiqar^^ The earliest text of the Life ofAhiqar, an
Aramaic papyrus, is dated 420-400 BCE, and it is generally accepted that Greeks
first came into contact with the legend of Ahiqar in roughly the same period.
Scholars have identified numerous points of contact between the Aesop and
Van Dijk 1995, 143.
See Perry 1952,4-10; Conybeare, Harris, and Lewis, 1913,2:715-784; Lindenberger 1983,
2:479-507; Oettinger 1992; Kussly 1992.
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Ahiqar legends, and it is difficult to say with certainty whether the Ahiqar material
is a late addition to a pre-existing Aesopic vita or whether it is more of a kernel
around which a fragmented Aesopic legend took shape and expanded during the
Hellenistic period.'*® The episodes borrowed from the story of Ahiqar have Aesop
traveling to Babylon {Vita G 101-111; 123) and Egypt (Vita G 112-123), provid
ing the Life with an exotic Near-Eastern aura and serving as a sort of bridge be
tween Aesop’s experiences on Samos (Vita G 20-100) and his confrontation with
the Delphians (Vita G 124-142). Reflecting general opinion, Tomas Hagg has ob
served that the Ahiqar material is ‘quite alien to the spirit of the rest of the Life,'
in particular the way in which Aesop’s precepts are ‘almost wholly irrelevant to
their context’.^® It is not my intention here to contradict this view by claiming that
the Ahiqar material in fact fits quite well in the Life. But I would like to draw
attention to some broad analogies between certain aspects of the Ahiqar sections
and other representations of the free Aesop’s fable-telling in Vita G 90-142.
Specifically, atchs. 109-110, the sage’s manner of imparting wisdom is anal
ogous to the other nine representations of the free Aesop’s fable-telling in two
important aspects: (1) Aesop is shown delivering established, fixed forms of wis
dom (not presented as improvisations); and (2) Aesop’s words of wisdom are of
a generalized character, not bound to the exigencies of a particular context.^*
The passages in which Aesop is assimilated to Ahiqar begin with a rapid and
dizzying series of events, immediately following upon Aesop’s writing down and
archiving of his fables in Samos {Vita G 100). There are a number of ways in
which Aesop is acknowledged now as a famous sage, comparable in stature to the
legendary Ahiqar, enjoying a comfortable proximity to royalty and expanding his
reputation in the Near East. Having been ‘recognized with many honors’ {Vita G
101), Aesop departs Samos and ‘tours the world’ {Vita G 101), ‘lectures to audi
ences for a fee’ Vita G 101) and settles first in Babylon where he ‘gives an expo
sition of philosophy’ and is ‘acclaimed as a great man by the Babylonians’ {Vita
G 101).^^ Aesop ‘solves philosophical conundrums’ for the king Lycurgus
''® Diogenes Laertius ascribes to Theophrastus a work entitled ‘Akicharos’ (D.L. 5,50). Es
sential questions about how and when the Ahiqar material came to be incorporated into the
Aesopic vita tradition are vexed and remain open. Adrados 1979 dates the establishment
of a connection between Ahiqar and Aesop to the fifth century BCE (cf. Kurke 2011),
while West 1984 dates the coimection to the Hellenistic period.
5“ Hagg 1997,182.
Two of the proverbs spoken by Aesop in the ‘Ahiqar’ sections in fact find echoes in the
Aesopic tradition; cf. Haslam 1986, 153-154.
Vita G 101: HoWainq Se xpovouq sv ifi Sdpo) 5iaTpt\|/a<; 6 Aiaontoi; Kai noLkaw xiprov
Kttxa^uoOelq f|PouLf|0q nspieLOeiv Tqv okoupsvqv, KUi ev xoig dKpoaxqpfotq bisLeyexo.
xtpfipaxa 5e dpyupiKd XtiuPdvaiv Ttaaov xe xdipav TtepieLOwv 6 AiocoTioq syevexo [6e] ev
BapuLdivi, ev fj ePaotLeuev AuKonpyoi;. embei^dpevoq 8e auxou xqv ipiXoaocplav peya?
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(npopA,fjn.axa cpiAxjoocpiai;, Vita G 102), who in turn ‘becomes an admirer of Ae
sop’s character and intelligence’ {Vita G 101). Aesop then adopts a son, named
Helios, in Babylon as ‘heir to his own wisdom’ (dx; 8id5oxov antou xfjg oocpiaq.
Vita G 103). Before beginning to recite an extended and unrelated series of prov
erbs to Helios, Aesop tells his adopted son to ‘preserve his words as a sacred trust’
(Kttl vuv onv (pnX,a^ov tootooi; (bq 7iapaKaxa0fiicr|v, Vita G 109). It is clear that
this parakatatheke does not involve imparting an intangible kind of instinct - the
‘quick wit’ (dyxivoiac;) or ‘readiness with words’ (enpeoiXoyoc;) that characterized
the slave’s wisdom performances in Vita G 1-90. Rather, this type of knowledge
is presented as something quasi-material, something Helios can possess and pre
serve. Indeed, Aesop presents it to Helios as a body of wisdom in the form of a
set of generalized precepts {Vita G 109-110):

tv oivo) pf) (pilokoya em5Eiicvup£vo<; TiaiSEiav dKatpox; ydp Kaxaoocpi^opEvog KaxayEkao0f|(ri]. o^nxEpa pdSi^E xfjq yk(bxxri(;. xoi(; eo Jtpdxxoooi pf] cpOoVEi dkkd ouy%aipE, xal peOe^ev; anxrav xfjt; Etwipa^iaq- 6 ydp (pOovwv dyvocov
Ettoxov pkdTtxEi. Sonkoov ooo EmpEkon, pExa5i6oi)^ adxoig dq)’ ®v £xei<;, rva
pf| {bq Kopiov povov EVxpETtcovxai OE, akka Kai (bq EOEpyEXTiv xipcboiv. Onpon
KpdxEi. Edv XI 7tapT|KpaKd)(; pav0dvi](;, pf| aloxuvOfjc;- PeXxiov ydp ovi/ipaOfj
pakkov f) dpaOfj KakEioOai. xfi yuvand oon Kpojcxon kuI dnoppfjxoov pq5£V
adxfl Sfjkov xIOei- x6 ydp ytvoo, dvxiriakov 6v npoq xf)v onpPioKTiv okriv xfiv
fipspav Ka0T|p^ oTtki^Exai, pqxav®li£vr| jtroq oon KopiEooEi.
When drinking wine do not discuss serious matters to show off your learning,
for you will be tripped up in an off moment and get yourself laughed at. Be
sharper than your tongue. Do not envy those who are successful, but rejoice
with them, and you will share in their good fortune, for he who is jealous
unwittingly harms himself. Take care of your slaves, and share what you have
with them so that they may not only obey you as their master but also honor
you as their benefactor. Rule your passions. If you learn a thing later than you
should, do not be ashamed, for it is better to be called a late learner than a
dolt. Keep your councils from your wife, and reveal no secrets to her, for
womankind is a rival in married life, and she will sit all day plotting and
scheming how to get you under control.

Ttapa Toi(; BaPuXxovioK; dvebeixOri, mors koI tov pamXEa epaorf|v auxoO yeveoBai xmv
ijOcov Sia TO vouv ootov ex^iv, kuI STiotTiaev auxov etiI xfiq 5ioiKf|a6CO(;.
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This excerpt is part of a series of twenty uninterrupted and unrelated proverbs,
amounting to the material inheritance (raipaKaTa0f|icr|) promised to Helios.
In keeping with the Life's representation of the free Aesop as the possessor of
an established body of wisdom, more emphasis is placed upon the free Aesop’s
status as a wise and learned man in Vita G 123 and 124. First, upon his return to
Babylon after time spent in Egypt, Aesop is honored again with a statue and cel
ebrated for his wisdom (kuI ETioirioev eopriiv peydA-riv 6 PaoiX£uq em xfj xou
Aioranou oo(pia). Then, we are told that Aesop traveled to other cities before his
fateful adventure in Delphi; in these unnamed cities Aesop ‘gave demonstrations
of his wisdom and learning’ {Vita G 123). It seems noteworthy that, once Aesop
is a freedman - that is, once he becomes an established teller of fables and is no
longer the slave bricoleur — we no longer hear a word about his hideously ugly
body, so prominent in his performances of wisdom in the first half of the work,
and we do not hear about any beatings or other forms of physical violence. To be
sure, there is plenty of danger:^^ we do read in these sections about two attempts
to kill Aesop, and the second, at the hands of the Delphians, is successful.

5. Conclusion
In the fictional world of the Life of Aesop, the conditions and exigencies of en
slavement and freedom give rise to two distinct modes of performance. By look
ing closely at some key differences between Aesop’s enslaved and free perfor
mances, I hope to have demonstrated that Aesop’s non-verbal communication and
improvisatory wit are connected with his physical vulnerability as a slave in var
ious ways, while his transformation into a kind of authority on human nature (cf.
Vita G 101) is bound up with his manumission and with his subsequent mastery
of a coherent, seemingly fixed body of wisdom. To put it another way, the slave’s
body is replaced by the free author’s (putative) corpus.
The distinctions drawn between enslaved and free performances in the Life
also reflect a dynamic tension that surfaces in virtually every phase of the fable’s
history: namely, a tension between (1) a putatively oral, improvisational, and pre
carious past, embedded in slavery, and (2) a written, fixed, and stable present,
circulating in the material reality of the literary text. Rather than reading (2) as

Finkelpearl 2003, 45, observes that ‘moments of real danger’ occur in the Life when the
fables take on a lasting, physical form. But Aesop faces serious physical danger from the
beginning of the Life; it is more precise to note that the key difference is that the free Aesop
faces existential threats but no longer physical ones.
5“ Vita G 104, 127.

254

JEREMY B. LEFKOWITZ

supplanting (1), and leading only to Aesop’s hubristic, fatal encounter with the
Delphians, we ought to recognize how rich and productive the tension between
the two has been for authors and fabulists throughout the history of the fable tra
dition. The two visions of Aesopic storytelling I have been describing are mapped
onto a life-cycle or ‘career’ in the Life of Aesop, with the result that the first vision
- in slavery - is the fable genre’s ‘past’, while the second vision - in freedom - is
the fable’s ‘present’ (or ‘future’). A strikingly similar idea can be found in the
middle of the prologue to the central book of Phaedrus’ five books of Latin verse
fables (Phaed. 3 Prol. 33-38):
Nunc, fabularum cur sit inventum genus,
brevi docebo. Servitus obnoxia,
quia quae volebat non audebat dicere,
affectus proprios in fabellas transtulit,
calumniamque fictis elusit iocis.
Ego illius pro semita feci viam
Now 1 will briefly explain why the fable genre was
invented. The slave, being legally vulnerable,
since he didn’t dare say openly what he wished to say,
transferred his personal feelings into fables,
and so avoided accusation with joking stories.
Where he cut a path I have built a broad road...
Phaedrus represents the pre-literate history of fable as something associated with
slavery and something dangerous; but his literate product is something very dif
ferent. Regardless of questions of historicity, Phaedrus presents himself as a free
writer, one who wants his readers to think that he is writing down material that
was originally oral and derived from slave experience.^^ Thus in Phaedrus, our
earliest surviving collection of Aesopica, the fable is presented as a translation
into Latin and a versification of material that was originally Greek, prose, and
socio-politically low. But what Phaedrus created is analogous to all of our surviv
ing Aesopica, including the Life ofAesop', as it survives in the literary record (in
its many different manifestations), it is always in a state of having already under
gone a process of becoming a literary product.

Champlin 2005.
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